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SIMON GREEN 
 
This article argues that although the UK and Germany have 
different historical traditions of immigration and integration, 
which continue to define policy responses in specific areas, 
recent developments show a distinct convergence in each 
country’s policy goals and adopted policy instruments in this 
sector. The article contends that both endogenous (demographic 
and skills shortages, integration deficits) and exogenous (influx 
of asylum seekers, terrorism) variables can be identified for this 
convergence. It also pinpoints the European Union as a growing 
source both of convergence and policy coordination in this field. 
 
 
Introduction 
In the context of this special issue on policy convergence in the UK and Germany, 
immigration and integration policy constitutes an obvious and in many ways ideal case 
study. There are three key reasons for this. First, for some decades now, both countries 
are two of the most significant destinations for immigration in the European Union 
(EU). In recent years, the two countries have received the highest volume of 
immigration and family reunification of all EU member-states, as well as granting the 
highest numbers of naturalisations; in absolute numbers of non-national residents, 
Germany and the UK are first and third respectively. Between 1998 and 2002, both 
countries took the top two places in the EU in terms of the number of asylum 
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applications lodged; even since then, both remain near the top.1 Indeed, with the 
possible exception of France, no other EU member-state can match the UK and 
Germany for both the sheer scale and diversity of immigration they have received, as 
well as for the long period of time over which this immigration has taken place. Some 
key indicators of immigration to the UK and Germany between 2002 and 2005 are 
given in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Second, and as will be elucidated below, both countries are facing broadly similar 
challenges in this field, including skills and demographic shortages and, perhaps most 
importantly, in the integration of their non-national / immigrant minorities,2 which has 
become a major political issue in Germany as well as the UK.3 The third reason for 
undertaking such a comparison lies in the politics of New Labour and the SPD-Green 
government, which came to power in the UK and Germany in May 1997 and October 
1998 respectively. Several other contributions to this collection draw on the ‘Third 
Way’ document,4 and although it makes no direct mention of immigration, both the 
Labour and the SPD-Green governments, upon assuming power, explicitly set out to 
‘modernise’ immigration and citizenship policy from the essentially undifferentiated 
restrictive emphasis which had characterised the preceding conservative 
administrations.5  
Together, this combination of common large scale immigration flows, similar 
challenges and the apparent ideological closeness of the two governments makes this 
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area a prime example of where policy convergence might be expected. In this context, 
and drawing on Bennett’s classification,6 it is helpful to distinguish between 
convergence of policy goals, which refers to the issues which are to be tackled, and of 
policy instruments, which for the purposes of this discussion will refer to the actual 
policies adopted to address the policy goals. This article will show that both these 
elements are visible in varying degrees across this policy field. 
At the same time, what makes this convergence all the more remarkable is that it 
has occurred against the backdrop of very different historical traditions in each of the 
two countries. The importance of history and traditions for understanding current 
politics and policy is of course widely acknowledged in political science, and the 
resulting ‘path dependence’ of initial political compromises or institutional 
configurations can be defined thus: ‘When a government programme or organisation 
embarks on a path there is an inertial tendency for those initial policy choices to persist. 
That path may be altered, but it requires a good deal of political pressure to produce that 
change’.7 In immigration and citizenship, as in several other areas covered in this 
collection, path dependence has been clearly identified by scholars in the cases of the 
UK and Germany.8 
This article therefore begins by sketching out these historical traditions before 
examining a range of common pressures, both exogenous and endogenous, which has 
affected policy goals and instruments in the two countries. It also pinpoints membership 
of the EU and the gradual development of a common EU immigration policy as a key 
factor behind convergence in individual areas. The extent and nature of convergence is 
then discussed by drawing on examples from three main policy sub-fields: labour and 
dependant migration policy, integration and citizenship policy, and asylum policy. In 
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addition, key exceptions to this pattern of convergence will also be outlined. In its 
conclusion, the article reviews the extent of convergence that has been identified and 
compares political and structural factors behind this. 
Historical traditions in immigration and integration policy 
One of the most striking factors of the convergence of policy is that where it has 
taken place in this field, it has occurred despite, and not because of, the very different 
prevailing traditions of immigration in both countries. And, as will be argued later on in 
this article, in those areas where endogenous and exogenous pressures have not 
produced a degree of convergence, path dependence remains a central explanatory 
factor of policy responses in the UK and Germany. 
In the case of the UK, immigration and citizenship policy has been significantly 
influenced by the country’s colonial past.9 Between the 1950s and 1970s, the vast 
majority of immigrants came from Commonwealth countries, primarily the Indian sub-
continent and the Caribbean. Today, they constitute the majority of the immigrant 
population in the UK and its descendents, although there have been significant inflows 
of other nationalities since the late 1990s. These have occurred primarily via the asylum 
system, but also following the enlargement of the EU to central and eastern Europe in 
2004.  
Crucially, the fact that most immigration to the UK has been from 
Commonwealth countries has meant that access to citizenship, and in contrast to 
practically all other EU member-states, has been sidelined as a political issue. For under 
the British Nationality Act 1948, British citizenship (or more properly, subjecthood) 
was defined in a particularly expansive and inclusive way, which for all intents and 
purposes equated Commonwealth and British nationals. Nor has dual citizenship, which 
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has been particularly controversial in Germany, ever been a political factor the UK.10 
Indeed, the fact that the majority of the UK’s non-EU residents (or Third Country 
Nationals - TCNs) are Commonwealth nationals, who already possess most citizenship 
rights including voting rights, furnishes them with an enormously privileged position 
vis-à-vis other immigrant groups.  
What does of course set the British case aside from other European countries is 
the more formal issue of how residence rights were gradually detached from nationality 
during the second half of the twentieth century.11 Under the Commonwealth Immigrants 
Acts of 1962 and 1968, plus the Immigration Act 1971, access to residence in the UK 
was limited to ‘patrials’, or persons with direct family connections to the UK. This of 
course included most of the ‘old’ Commonwealth, specifically Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada, and excluded most people from ‘new’ Commonwealth countries such as 
India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. The situation was only partially resolved in the British 
Nationality Act (BNA) 1981, which drew a line under what had become the fallacy of a 
global Commonwealth subjecthood under the Crown,12 but in doing so created new sub-
sets of lesser citizenships in the form of British Dependent Territories Citizenship 
(BDTC) and British Overseas Citizenship (BOC). It also marked a departure from the 
pure application of the territorial principle in the ascription of British citizenship at birth 
(ius soli), in favour of the principle of descent (ius sanguinis) supplemented by a 
qualified form of ius soli. Significantly though, and despite the clear tendency towards 
the restriction of the scope of British citizenship culminating in the BNA 1981, the UK 
retains one of the most liberal set of rules concerning the acquisition of citizenship in 
the EU. In the future, this is likely to ease significantly the legal incorporation of new 
immigrants, especially TCNs and refugees. 
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The legacy of Commonwealth immigration has also affected a second area of 
difference between the UK and other EU member-states, namely its approach to 
integration.13 This has been based on the ‘race relations’ paradigm, in which an 
aspiration to strict immigration controls was combined with pragmatic and ‘laissez-
faire’ integration.14 Throughout the second half of the twentieth century, the UK never 
attempted to pursue a joined-up integration policy; instead, its approach was 
characterised by the famous definition put forward by the then Home Secretary Roy 
Jenkins in a speech in 1966:  
I do not think we need in this country a ‘melting pot’, which will 
turn everyone out in a common mould, as one of a series of 
carbon copies of someone’s misplaced vision of the stereotyped 
Englishman … I define integration, therefore, not as a flattening 
process of uniformity, but cultural diversity, coupled with 
equality of opportunity in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance.15 
In practice, this meant that each immigrant community group was encouraged to 
cherish and foster its own minority ethnic identity (Jenkins’ ‘diversity’). At the same 
time, ‘mutual tolerance’ was enforced through some of the most comprehensive anti-
discrimination legislation in the EU, in the form of the Race Relations Acts 1965, 1968 
and 1976.16 
By contrast, Germany’s historical legacy in immigration and integration policy 
can best be summarised by the statement ‘Germany is not a country of immigration’ 
(Deutschland ist kein Einwanderungsland), which punctuated government policy 
statements and documents throughout the 1970s, 1980s and up to the advent of the 
SPD-Green federal government in 1998. The rationale for this position dates back to the 
era of formalised labour recruitment (the so-called Gastarbeiter years), during which 
mainly young men were actively and formally recruited from Mediterranean countries, 
in particular Turkey, Italy and Yugoslavia, to come and work in West German factories 
 7 
and companies.17 Their employment and hence residence was never considered to be 
anything other than temporary, and for that reason, few efforts were made to structure or 
promote their integration. However, when the SPD-FDP government called a halt to 
organised labour migration in 1973 (the Anwerbestopp), the perspectives of the 
remaining Gastarbeiter were swiftly transformed from a hitherto temporary group into a 
more permanent minority.18 Accordingly, and against general expectations, the number 
of non-nationals in West Germany did not decrease after 1973 as the remaining 
temporary workers returned home: on the contrary, numbers increased due to new 
migration for the purposes of family reunification. Consequently, such secondary 
migration itself quickly became a policy priority in terms of restriction and actively 
divided the main parties for much of the 1980s and, to a lesser extent, the 1990s. 
This migration alone would have justified rethinking the paradigm of the non-
immigration country. But further large-scale primary immigration arose from the late 
1970s onwards in the form of asylum seekers, and has continued ever since. Indeed, at 
its peak between 1990 and 1993, over 1.2 million persons claimed asylum in Germany. 
Furthermore, (West) Germany has also been the destination for one of the world’s 
largest ethnic migrations, with over 4 million ethnic Germans, mainly from Poland, 
Romania and most recently the former Soviet Union, arriving between 1950 and 2004. 
Their right of entry was originally enshrined in the 1953 Refugees and Expellees’ Law 
(Bundesvertriebenen- und Flüchtlingsgesetz), which, in a remarkable example of path 
dependence, continued until the end of the Cold War, when sharply rising numbers of 
arrivals rendered this entry mode unsustainable. Even now, any ethnic German born 
before 1993 can apply to be recognised as such, which, as well as right of entry to 
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Germany, brings with it automatic citizenship and still comparatively generous help 
with linguistic, social and economic integration into German society.19  
As early as 1980, this accumulation of immigration flows had transformed most 
large West German cities into permanent multi-ethnic, culturally pluralist spaces. Yet 
the political adjustment to this fundamentally changed reality has been slow.20 The 
possibilities of permanent residence remained highly restrictive, and it was a decision 
by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1978, not a change in government policy, which 
opened up this avenue in the first place.21 In particular, citizenship remained an elusive 
status, with no provision for ius soli at all, combined with very high requirements for 
naturalisation, including long periods of residence, eye-watering fee levels, a high 
degree of ‘integration’ (or more properly, assimilation) into German culture and a 
rejection of dual nationality.22 This also reflected the prevailing political view of 
integration, which, for instance in the debate over Leitkultur (or ‘guiding culture’) of 
2000,23 has consistently emphasised the duty of non-nationals in Germany to adapt to 
indigenous values, in whatever way these are defined. Indeed, until 1998 it was explicit 
government policy that naturalisation could only occur at the end of a successful 
integrative process, and not be considered a stepping stone towards this ultimate goal. 
Moreover, despite the extent of immigration to West Germany, it was considered 
politically impossible to reform citizenship as long as the country remained divided. In 
an explicit attempt to undermine the German Democratic Republic (GDR), (West) 
Germany deliberately maintained Imperial Germany’s 1913 citizenship law as the basis 
for its citizenship, since the law’s pan-Germanic focus by definition included the 
citizens of the GDR.24 Here too, then, the dynamics of path dependence are in evidence: 
it was not until 1999, almost ten years after unification and only once the government 
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had changed, that enough political momentum could be generated to pass a new 
citizenship law at all.25 Although the new law’s provisions have meant some 
liberalisation, in particular through the introduction of partial ius soli, its overall impact 
has been much less than expected.26 In consequence, access to full citizenship in 
Germany remains, even today, the exception rather than the rule. 
Certainly, the historical traditions in the UK and Germany show considerable 
differences in the way the two countries have approached immigration and integration. 
Although both countries have emphasised their desire to restrict new immigration since 
the 1970s, the UK has generally been more relaxed about its status as a country of 
immigration than Germany. At the same time, that is not to say that immigration and 
‘race’ have not been passionately contested issues in Britain – witness for instance the 
Notting Hill riots in 1958, the notorious 1964 election campaign in Smethwick,27 Enoch 
Powell’s apocalyptic 1968 vision of violent ethnic conflict, the Brixton riots of 1981 
and the 1997 Macpherson report into institutional racism in the Metropolitan police. 
By contrast, Germany has only recently begun to acknowledge that it is an 
ethnically and culturally diverse society. Indeed, the extent to which this is the case has 
only become clear in the last years: in 2005, the Mikrozensus revealed that over 15 
million people in Germany, or almost one in five inhabitants, had some form of migrant 
background.28 Much of this gradual transformation can be traced back to unification. 
This not only unleashed unprecedented migratory forces in the form of asylum seekers 
and ethnic Germans, but also rendered void one of the defining purposes of West 
Germany’s citizenship policy: the undermining of the GDR.29 Even so, the distinction 
between ‘Germans’ and ‘others’ remains largely intact, as illustrated by the party 
political focus on the perceived unwillingness of existing non-nationals 
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(Bestandsausländer) to integrate into German society. In the UK, Tony Blair did make a 
similar call on immigrants to conform in a speech on 8 December 2006, but this was 
generally directed at new, not existing, communities – a fine but important distinction.30 
As the remainder of this article will go on to show, these broadly different starting 
points have nonetheless led to policy convergence in a number of areas, although some 
significant differences inevitably remain. Where convergence has taken place, it has 
done so as a result of a number of pressures, and it is to these that this article now turns. 
Pressures towards convergence 
The pressures towards policy convergence in the UK and Germany can broadly be 
categorised under two headings: exogenous and endogenous pressures. In turn, under 
the rubric of exogenous pressures, two principal forces can be identified: asylum 
seekers and terrorism. Certainly, asylum is not a new political issue in Germany. As 
Figure 1 shows, (West) Germany has accepted large numbers of asylum seekers ever 
since 1980. Indeed, during the 1980s and early 1990s, asylum within the EU was in 
effect a purely (West) German problem, as anything up to two-thirds of annual 
applications to EU-15 countries were made in Germany. 
 
Figure 1 about here 
 
But Figure 1 also shows that, following the constitutional changes in 1993, the 
numbers of asylum seekers to Germany began to drop off; indeed, in 2004, just 35,000 
applications were made in Germany, the lowest level for twenty years. Of course, the 
pressures for asylum themselves did not disappear (witness the rising number of total 
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applications to the EU-15 from 1996 to 2002). Instead, applications were spread over a 
larger number of countries and, for the first time, asylum was no longer a de facto 
German problem. 
In the first instance, it was in fact the UK which replaced Germany as the EU’s 
primary destination for asylum seekers.31 In 2000, the UK exceeded Germany’s total 
asylum applications for the first time, and it has continued to do so in subsequent years 
too. From 2000 to 2003, the UK was in fact the largest destination for asylum 
applications in the EU, although it was overtaken in 2004 by France. However, it must 
also be noted that the scale of asylum applications to the UK at all times remained far 
lower than in Germany during the early 1990s: even at their peak in 2002, the number 
of asylum seekers to the UK was lower than the 107,000 applications lodged in West 
Germany as early as 1980. But crucially, the increase in numbers has raised much the 
same kinds of policy questions in the UK as it has done in Germany, as the existing 
‘liberal universalist’ model of asylum has came under severe pressure.32 It also opened 
up the possibility of both countries co-operating together in context of the EU to achieve 
EU-wide solutions, a point which will be returned to below. 
The second key exogenous pressure, which has also taken on an endogenous 
dimension, especially in Britain, has been that of security generally, and terrorism more 
specifically. Although in both countries there has always been an internal security 
dimension to migration policy, this has taken on a much more dominant role in the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington DC on 11 September 
2001, and the subsequent suicide bombings in London in July 2005.33 Both countries 
have considered themselves in the front line against (radical Islamic) terrorism, due not 
only to the fact that both have large Muslim populations, but also because a 
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considerable number of Islamic fundamentalists, such as the cleric Abu Hamza and 
Metin Kaplan were granted asylum or settled in Britain and Germany respectively after 
fleeing political persecution in their home countries. Unsurprisingly, following the 
suicide bombings in London in July 2005, this issue has been more explicit in the UK 
than in Germany. Overall, the spectre of terrorism has contributed both to the explicit 
‘securitisation’ of immigration policy, especially at EU-level,34 as well as to a renewed 
emphasis on assimilatory elements of integration and citizenship, as the discussion 
below will argue.35 
These two major exogenous pressures towards convergence are complemented by 
two further endogenous factors: demographic and skills shortages, and the persistence 
of apparent structural deficits in the integration of immigrants and non-nationals. 
Demographically, both countries are about to feel the full impact of long-term shifts in 
population structures, in particular the sharp reduction in the fertility rate most 
European countries have experienced at various stages since the early 1970s. In 2004, 
Germany’s fertility rate was just 1.4 children per woman; in the UK, it was 1.8 – better, 
but nowhere near the 2.2 level needed for population stability.36 What is more, this 
reduction in the number of children born in the UK and Germany has combined with 
increasing life expectancies to multiply the deleterious impact on support ratios between 
those of working age (15-64) and the remainder of the population. In this context, the 
UN Population Division in 2000 famously, albeit rather crudely, calculated that the 
number of immigrants required by the UK and Germany 2050 to keep support ratios at 
their 1995 levels, about 4:1 in both countries, was 1 million and 3.4 million respectively 
per annum.37 Certainly, (non-EU) immigration is by itself not a viable solution to such 
structural developments, as immigrants of working age are destined to retire from the 
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labour market themselves at a future stage. But tellingly, the Office of National 
Statistics’ prediction that the UK population will grow to 67 million by 2031 is largely 
predicated on continuing net immigration. By contrast, Germany’s population is 
predicted to fall to around 73 million in 2050 despite assumed net immigration of 
200,000 persons per annum.38  
The UK and Germany’s demographic problems are complicated by persistent 
skills shortages in key areas of the economy. In the UK, the Learning and Skills Council 
identified some 679,000 vacancies in the UK economy for 2003, principally in health 
and social work, business services and hotels and catering.39 In Germany too, skills 
shortages have persisted despite high levels of unemployment, with a survey of 
employers showing acute shortfalls in the pharmaceutical, engineering and information 
technology sectors.40 Together, this combination of skills and demographic shortages 
has created strong pressure in both countries, especially from business interests, in 
favour of a more relaxed approach to labour migration. 
The second endogenous factor towards convergence has been growing concerns 
about integration outcomes. In both countries, migrants and their descendants are, 
generally speaking, more likely than the indigenous population to suffer from lower 
educational outcomes, lower incomes and lower language skills.41 In particular, their 
unemployment rates are often double those of the population as a whole.42 Significantly, 
these integration problems are not spread equally across national or ethnic groups: in the 
UK, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis are particularly disadvantaged in terms of education 
and labour market outcomes, while in Germany, Turkish and ex-Yugoslav nationals are 
the most affected. Notably, ethnic German immigrants, who have already been granted 
citizenship on entry to the country, display strikingly similar patterns of exclusion to the 
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non-national population. Overall, both countries are grappling with comparable 
problems of social cohesion within and between their respective immigrant and non-
national communities. 
One further pressure towards convergence needs to be considered at this point: the 
European Union. Over the past 15 years the EU’s influence in this field has grown 
exponentially: its immigration policy has evolved from ‘loose intergovernmental 
cooperation to a partially communitarised policy-making area’ under the 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam, with an explicit aspiration of developing a common asylum policy for all 
EU member-states.43 Certainly, the process of ‘Europeanisation’ in this particular field 
is multifaceted, encompassing both the framing of issues and their governance, both of 
which have generated a rich body of academic literature;44 the resulting implications of 
Europeanisation for policy convergence more generally are also discussed in greater 
detail in the Introduction and in Simon Bulmer’s contribution to this collection. But 
essentially, Europeanisation can be considered to consist of both the ‘uploading’ of 
national policy preferences into the supranational policy-making process, and the 
‘downloading’ of EU policy into the national policy arena, and it is these aspects which, 
within the spatial limitations of this article, will be the primary focus here. 
Yet despite setting the goal of a common immigration and asylum policy, as well 
as its affirmation in the European Council meetings at Tampere in 1999 and at The 
Hague in 2004, progress towards fulfilling it has been painstakingly slow, for several 
reasons. For one thing, EU member-states’ interests are quite heterogeneous in this area. 
Although pressures of numbers in asylum now affect most European countries, they do 
not do so equally – of EU-15 states, Italy, Portugal and Spain all received less than 1 
asylum application per 1,000 inhabitants during 2001-5, compared with 3.3 for 
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Germany and 5.5 for the UK.45 Second, because immigration is a classic ‘high politics’ 
area, concerns over loss of sovereignty are also clearly visible in this sector – witness 
the UK’s refusal to participate in the communitisation of the Schengen Accord on 
border controls under the Treaty of Amsterdam, as well as in the EU’s common visa 
policy. Lastly, the bar for achieving a communitised policy is set higher in this policy 
field than in others: whereas the single market can operate according to the principle of 
‘mutual recognition’ of standards and norms, a common immigration area cannot do so, 
and therefore requires full-scale harmonisation. Unsurprisingly, and given the first two 
factors, this has been difficult to achieve.46 Key directives in this field on family 
reunification, asylum and the status of long-term resident third country nationals have 
only been agreed after literally years of negotiations.47 Collectively, it can be argued 
that such Directives have established something approaching an EU-wide immigration 
policy. Even so, in order to achieve agreement between member-states, they have in part 
fallen back on principles such as mutual recognition, for instance in the conditions for 
granting long-term residence status to TCNs, as well as, in the case of family 
reunification, so-called EU-wide ‘minimum standards’.48 The extent to which the EU’s 
immigration policy can be considered to be harmonised fully thus remains very much 
open to debate. 
Nonetheless, the UK and Germany have both at different times been keen to use 
the EU in order to find solutions to their own national problems. During the height of 
asylum applications to Germany in the early 1990s, the CDU/CSU-FDP government 
under Helmut Kohl made it a political priority to seek an EU-wide asylum policy. 
However, given the widespread opposition to this from other, less-affected member-
states, Germany had to content itself with the inclusion of asylum and immigration 
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under the intergovernmental ‘third pillar’ under the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht.49 
Subsequently, the government reverted to a domestic solution in the form of the 1993 
constitutional amendments, after which Germany became much less willing to support 
integration at all costs. This trend increased as it became apparent that the European 
Commission was pursuing a somewhat more liberal line on asylum than Germany was 
prepared to countenance.50  
Similarly, the UK’s discovery of the European arena coincided with the peak in its 
asylum applications between 2000 and 2003.51 Despite having secured the possibility to 
‘opt-in’ to this area under the Treaty of Amsterdam, the UK signed up to all seven 
measures on asylum adopted by the EU between 1999 and 2004. Andrew Geddes 
therefore concludes that ‘Britain has thus become a little more European in its migration 
management policies in the hope that Europe will become a little more British in terms 
of convergent policy preferences’.52 At the same time, both countries also use their EU 
membership as a forum for informal coordination. Along with France, Italy and Spain 
and Poland, both are members of the so-called ‘G6’ group of large member-states, 
whose regular meetings, including in this policy area, have served as an informal forum 
for the coordination of policies and actions. 
Convergence and non-convergence in policy agendas and responses 
This, then, is the historical and topical background against which policy 
convergence can be considered. And indeed, it is apparent that some convergence in 
policy goals, both domestic and European, as well as to some extent in actual policy 
instruments adopted, has taken place between the two countries, even though 
divergence persists in other areas. Without claiming to be exhaustive, especially with 
reference to EU initiatives, the following section draws on a range of examples from the 
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domestic and supranational arenas to illustrate this argument. It is subdivided into three 
substantive areas, each of which illustrates increasing levels of convergence: labour and 
dependant migration, citizenship and integration policy, and asylum policy. 
Labour and dependant migration 
Initially, labour migration represented one of the core elements of the process of 
modernisation in immigration policy which New Labour and the SPD-Green 
governments aspired to. Instead of maintaining their predecessors’ ultimately 
undeliverable promises to prevent (non-ethnic) immigration altogether,53 the centre-left 
governments in the UK and Germany resolved instead to structure migration to the 
respective countries’ advantage. This change in perspective coincided not only with 
demographic and skills issues returning to the fore, but also with the boom of the ‘New 
Economy’, with its seemingly insatiable demand for new ideas and skills in information 
technology. And it was this sector which proved to be the catalyst to new labour 
migration in both countries.54 In February 2000, Chancellor Schröder, to widespread 
acclaim from business leaders, announced the introduction of the so-called ‘Green Card’ 
scheme, under which up to 20,000 IT specialists would be allowed to work for up to 
five years in Germany. Despite its limited scope, this proposal helped redefine the terms 
of the debate, by emphasising for the first time in almost 30 years that immigration 
could actually benefit Germany.55 This principle was carried forward in 2001 into the 
discussion over the form a possible comprehensive immigration law 
(Zuwanderungsgesetz), the first in Germany’s history, might take. The so-called 
Süssmuth Commission, which was set up by Interior Minister Otto Schily to develop 
reform proposals, even suggested a points-based system to attract an annual quota of 
high-skilled migrants, plus additional migration in shortage sectors.56  
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In the end, though, the Commission’s recommendations proved too radical a 
change in political terms. Faced with an electorate which remained deeply sceptical 
about immigration, not least in times of record unemployment, the opposition 
CDU/CSU dropped its initial support for the government. Ultimately, the new law, 
which did not come into force until 1 January 2005, failed to go beyond providing 
limited entry possibilities to individual high-skilled migrants from outside the EU. 
Tellingly, the Green Card programme itself proved not to be a great draw either: not 
even the initial, distinctly modest quota could be fulfilled.57 What is more, holders of 
Green Cards quickly came up against ingrained administrative patterns of 
implementation, which continued to view their very presence as undesirable.58 Yet 
despite such setbacks, the issue of new labour migration remains very much on the 
political agenda and during 2006, the CDU/CSU-SPD Grand Coalition began to explore 
once more the possibility of introducing a points-based entry system for high-skilled 
migrants.59 
In the UK, the policy response to demographic and skills shortages was similar, 
although it went much further than in Germany. In contrast to its German counterpart, 
the Home Office from the outset went on the offensive in terms of framing labour 
migration, both skilled and unskilled, as indispensable to the UK economy; crucially, 
and in direct contrast to Germany, it met with little resistance, due no doubt also to the 
continued buoyant economic situation in Britain.60 Thus in early 2002, the UK 
government introduced the Highly Skilled Migrants Programme (HSMP), which aimed 
to attract non-EU professionals, principally in finance, information technology and 
medical services, and which sat alongside a range of entry schemes for both high-skilled 
and lesser skilled migrants.61 But in the UK too, the HSMP has not been seen as a 
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success, due to its cumbersome process and perceived inflexibility.62 Since then, the UK 
government, in its five-year strategy for migration published in 2005, has outlined plans 
to consolidate all existing entry schemes into a single, points-based system of 
recruitment.63 
In labour migration, then, there has been a certain degree of convergence around 
the overall policy goal of facilitating the immigration of skilled labour. There has also 
been convergence around the policy instruments for facilitating such migration, in the 
form of a points system. That said, the UK has been prepared to countenance a much 
wider definition of labour migration than Germany, to include lower and even unskilled 
migrants. Clearly, along with more favourable public opinion, the strength of the UK 
labour market compared to Germany’s (see the contribution by Funk to this collection) 
is a major factor behind the UK’s hitherto more liberal approach. 
Indeed, this constitutes the principal dimension of divergence between the two 
countries, which became most clearly visible in their responses to the 2004 accession of 
eight central and eastern European countries to the EU. Germany, together with Austria, 
imposed a seven-year delay in the implementation of free movement of labour for these 
states, whereas the UK, Ireland and Sweden opened their labour markets immediately. 
However, despite its restrictions, Germany has been grappling with formally self-
employed tile-layers and abattoir workers from accession states undercutting existing 
labour. Even the UK government has been taken by surprise by the extent of labour 
migration from these countries: between May 2004 and June 2006, a total of almost 
447,000 workers, mainly from Poland, were registered in the UK.64 This has been far 
more than the government originally estimated and has prompted the Home Office to 
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limit access to the UK labour market to self-employed workers from Bulgaria and 
Romania following these countries’ accession on 1 January 2007. 
Dependant migration constitutes a further area of divergence in both policy goals 
and instruments between the UK and Germany.65 In Germany, this has been one of the 
most protracted areas of dispute in immigration policy, and the subject of party conflict 
since the early 1980s. The single most recurrent issue has been the age limit for children 
to immigrate to join their parents, which has been set at 16 since 1981, but which the 
CDU/CSU has periodically attempted to lower to 12, ten or even six. By contrast, 
although family reunification has been recognised as an important issue, it has rarely 
been politicised in the same way as in Germany, and certainly not around the same 
totemic issue. Indeed, when the 2003 Directive on Family Reunification set a minimum 
age of twelve for any limitation of the immigration of dependant minors, this 
represented a direct ‘uploading’ of the debate at that time in Germany (which was being 
held in the context of the discussions over the Zuwanderungsgesetz); other member-
states could of course choose to diverge upwards in setting this limit. In the UK, by 
contrast, family reunification has never been as polarised as in Germany; indeed, the 
UK chose not to opt in to the EU Directive. Here, then, is a further example of the 
power of path dependence: because the German discussion about family reunification 
has been framed for over 20 years around the specific issue of the maximum age of 
dependant minors, this not only continues to affect contemporary policy-making 
(witness the discussions about the Zuwanderungsgesetz between 2000 and 2004),66 but 
has even shaped policy instruments for the EU as a whole. 
Citizenship and integration policy 
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The second area where policy convergence can be identified is in citizenship and 
integration policy. As was noted above, this policy area has grown in importance within 
this sector as a result of the persistence of structural integration problems in both 
countries. An additional catalyst in this respect has also been the impact of 9/11, which 
has not only moved security considerations into the spotlight, but also raised public 
expectations of immigrants to identify actively with, and to assimilate more explicitly 
into, their countries of residence.67 This convergence in policy agendas has generated 
specific convergence in three principal areas. 
First, the formal provisions for naturalisation are converging, not only in the UK 
and Germany but also across other EU member-states.68 Indeed, the direction of 
convergence is interesting: whereas Germany, like most other EU countries, has tended 
to liberalise its citizenship provisions during the 1990s, the British Nationality Act 1981 
actually represented a restriction. In both cases, this can be put down to respective 
historical traditions: thus, Germany started from an almost completely exclusive 
position in the 1970s, while the main policy challenge for the UK during the 1960s and 
1970s was to manage the retreat from the expansive definitions of the British 
Nationality Act 1948. But certainly, a degree of convergence is crystallising in 
citizenship policy, with both countries employing a mixture of ius soli and ius sanguinis 
in the ascription of citizenship at birth, and both countries as a rule requiring between 
five and ten years’ residence for naturalisation. 
Second, these baseline requirements have been supplemented in recent years by 
additional criteria aimed at raising the symbolic value of obtaining British and German 
citizenship. In the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, the UK introduced 
both citizenship tests and ceremonies, which themselves drew heavily on the practises 
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of countries such as Canada and Australia.69 Germany followed suit in mid-2006, with 
the Länder collectively agreeing on the inclusion and organisation of naturalisation tests 
and a formal ceremony, both of which had hitherto been implemented only on an ad hoc 
basis.70  
In fact, the introduction of integration courses and tests generally is emerging as 
an area of convergence between the two countries. However, this was not always the 
case. In Germany, the 2004 Zuwanderungsgesetz linked integration and language 
classes explicitly to permanent residence and not nationality, while the opposite was 
true for the UK. Now, not only is Germany making naturalisations subject to tests, but 
in his speech of 8 December 2006 Tony Blair also announced that the UK would 
introduce a language requirement for permanent residence.71 Even though the two 
countries’ respective philosophies of integration persist (see above), it is clear, 
therefore, that integration policy as structured by government is starting to show distinct 
signs of convergence. Significantly, this convergence is not limited to the UK and 
Germany, but encompasses other member-states too.72 
Third, following the inclusion of an anti-discrimination provision in Article 13 of 
the Treaty of Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999, a Racial Equality Directive 
and an Employment Equality Directive were passed only one year later in 2000.73 Of 
these, the content and aims of the former bears close resemblance to the UK model of 
race relations legislation (see above). At first sight, this therefore appears to be a clear 
example of an ‘uploading’ to the EU and subsequent diffusion to other EU member-
states of existing UK norms and practises. But as Andrew Geddes and Virginie 
Guiraudon show in a fascinating study, the full picture is more complex.74 They argue 
that the very adoption of Article 13 at Amsterdam was contingent on the victory of 
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centre-left governments in both France and the UK in early 1997, both of which, albeit 
for different reasons, favoured its inclusion in the Treaty. Furthermore, the SPD-Green 
government in Germany, having won the 1998 federal election, then also committed 
itself to formulating Germany’s first anti-discrimination law in its subsequent coalition 
agreement.75 This meant that when the European Commission tabled the first draft of 
the Race Equality Directive in late 1999, the broad policy goals of the governments of 
three key EU member-states had already converged, although this was due less to 
ideological factors than to an independent alignment of national positions. However, 
ideology did come into play in the adoption of the policy instrument in the form of the 
Directive itself, which was completed by June 2000, just seven months after being 
introduced. Although Geddes and Guiraudon also acknowledge the role of the 
Portuguese Presidency in this process, they pinpoint one factor in particular: the 
formation of the new Austrian government in early 2000 to include the extremist 
Freedom Party under Jörg Haider. This prompted other member-states, mainly with 
centre-left governments, to back this Directive, even in cases when, as in France and 
Germany, the country’s traditional interpretation of the role of anti-discrimination 
legislation did not match with the focus of the policy instrument.76 The Directive was 
finally transposed into German national law during 2006.  
The case of the Race Equality Directive highlights how convergence in policy 
instruments can occur. Certainly, the EU played an indispensable role in this; but at the 
same time, the independent convergence of national positions was a vital precondition 
for the success of the Commission’s initiative.77 Interestingly, the question of an 
ideological convergence of governments appears only to have played a subsidiary role, 
principally in determining the response to Austria’s new government. Yet in this area, 
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the Directive arguably represents the start of convergence, not its conclusion, as both 
national courts and the European Court of Justice are likely to guide its implementation. 
Even so, areas of divergence remain in citizenship and integration policy, and they 
are areas in which the historical legacies in both countries are arguably most clearly 
visible. First, there is clear divergence in the status of nationality as a policy goal. In the 
UK, as noted above, the acquisition of nationality is not politically contested in any real 
way. This is due also to the fact that the UK’s (Commonwealth) immigrants already 
possess voting rights, which is itself a clear historical legacy and one which affects the 
structure of British Citizenship in a path dependent fashion. In Germany, by contrast, 
the incorporation of non-nationals, over 20 per cent of which were actually born in 
Germany, has continued to be sluggish. Correspondingly, access to citizenship rights 
remains a substantive political issue which is hotly contested, not least for electoral 
reasons: ethnic German immigrants tend to vote overwhelmingly for the CDU/CSU, 
while naturalised immigrants, for instance of Turkish origin, support the SPD and 
Greens by a comparable margin.78 Similarly, the question to what degree dual 
citizenship should be tolerated in Germany, although latent, remains highly salient; 
conversely, there is no real prospect of it being politicised in the UK.  
Asylum policy 
The third area to be considered, and the one which shows the greatest degree of 
convergence, has been asylum policy.79 In two key respects, convergence in fact took 
place long before the election of New Labour and the SPD-Green coalition to 
government: during the 1980s, both the UK and West Germany used visa requirements 
and carrier sanctions for undocumented immigration to prevent asylum seekers from 
even being able to lodge a claim in country. Nonetheless, the fact that, for most of the 
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1980s and 1990s asylum was a ‘German problem’ (see above) meant that there was 
little direct convergence beyond the general desire in both governments to keep claims 
for asylum as low as possible. However, this changed in the late 1990s with the sharp 
increase in asylum applications to the UK. Faced with record numbers (and record 
costs), the UK government drew on a range of ideas first developed in the German 
context.  
First and foremost, in 2000, the UK introduced a formal system of ‘dispersal’ for 
asylum seekers, in order to spread their accommodation around the country, as opposed 
to London and the South East (in particular Kent), which had hitherto borne the brunt of 
this task.80 This instrument drew obvious comparisons with Germany, where the Länder 
have been allocated fixed proportions of the total number of asylum applications since 
the late 1970s. Although the two countries’ systems of dispersal in fact differ in key 
respects,81 it is the similarity in their aims, a more-or-less formal system of ‘burden-
sharing’, which is of relevance here. 
Second, and linked to this, the UK in 2000 replaced its cash payments to asylum 
seekers. Under the new system, asylum seekers received the bulk of their welfare 
payments via vouchers, which could be used to purchase goods in shops and 
supermarkets. This too drew on German practices, in which welfare is mostly provided 
‘in kind’, for instance in the form of food parcels, but where some municipalities also 
use a voucher system.82 However, in the UK, the system was heavily criticised for the 
fact that the retailers would not be required to give change on the vouchers. Unhelpfully 
for the government, the French company Sodexho, which had run the German version 
and which was now operating the British scheme, issued promotional literature in which 
retailers were urged to sign up in order to exploit the ‘revenue-making opportunities’ 
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this presented.83 In 2002, the vouchers were dropped for asylum seekers in favour of a 
return to cash payments, thereby actually marking a divergence from German policy 
instruments. 
Third, the UK has, in the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, 
introduced a so-called ‘White List’ of countries from which asylum applications are not 
accepted. Again, this draws on the ‘Safe Country of Origin’ category introduced in 
Germany as early as 1993, although the countries listed notably do not coincide. In 
Germany, non-European countries on the list are limited to Ghana and Senegal, while 
the UK in November 2006 considered Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, South Africa, India, 
Jamaica, Mongolia and Sri Lanka to be safe, as well as Ghana and Nigeria for male 
applicants only. 
Overall, then, in those areas where a broad convergence in domestic asylum 
policy has taken place, the UK has tended to follow, and on occasion even exceed, the 
German example. Curiously, an almost reverse picture emerges in the case of debates at 
EU level, due largely to Germany’s growing reluctance to integrate further in this policy 
area. For instance, in the 2004 Qualifications Directive,84 Germany finally accepted the 
principle of recognition of non-state agents of persecution in asylum; hitherto, this 
question had been one of the most visible and contested elements of divergence between 
several EU member-states, including the UK and Germany. A second example concerns 
the processing of asylum seekers: in the run-up to the 2003 European Council meeting 
in Thessaloniki, the UK proposed that ‘regional protection areas’ (in areas of origin) and 
‘transit processing areas’ (in neighbouring countries to the EU) be set up, with the aim 
of preventing asylum seekers from even arriving in the EU. While these proposals were 
 27 
roundly rejected by Germany at the time, Interior Minister Otto Schily performed a 
remarkable volte-face just one year later, by supporting similar Italian proposals.85 
But the EU has also served as a vehicle for informal cooperation in areas of 
mutual interest. Key among these has been the sensitive area of the repatriation of failed 
asylum seekers: in both countries, numbers of removals have been low in recent years, 
and both countries’ governments have grappled with the practical issues surrounding 
repatriation.86 In this context, the Interior Ministers of the UK and Germany, along with 
their counterparts from France, Italy and Spain, agreed in 2005 to operate joint 
repatriation flights to countries of origin. In May 2006, this initiative was adopted by all 
25 member-states.87 
As the previous examples show, the extent of convergence, both in the overall 
policy goals and some of the actual instruments adopted, is considerable, and greater 
than in labour migration and citizenship and integration policy. This development is 
certainly linked to the fact that asylum has constituted an explicit common policy 
challenge to both countries, encouraging common responses. Indeed, the pressures have 
been such that policy divergence is now effectively limited to individual policy 
instruments, but not policy goals. 
Conclusion 
The preceding analysis has argued that there is notable convergence between the 
UK and Germany in a number of goals in immigration policy, as well as in a range of 
specific policy instruments adopted. This convergence is most evident in asylum policy, 
but also in citizenship policy and, to a lesser extent, labour migration policy. The extent 
of convergence in this sector is summarised in Table 2. 
 28 
 
- Table 2 about here - 
 
Most significantly, where convergence has occurred, it has done so despite the 
very different historical traditions of response to immigration in both countries. It has 
also done so despite differences in public opinion and differences in the political 
system, which after all affects the way in which policy goals are articulated and 
negotiated. This testifies to the strength of the endogenous and exogenous pressures 
identified – the demographic rationale for new labour migration, the sheer pressures of 
numbers in the asylum system and the politicisation of integration deficits, real or 
otherwise. In particular, and despite the UK’s de iure opt-in, the EU stands out as a key 
vehicle towards convergence, especially in the field of asylum policy, where 
harmonisation is most advanced. The EU has not only acted as a source of policy 
initiatives in its own right, but has also afforded both countries the opportunity to 
‘escape to Europe’ in seeking solutions to their national asylum problems. In addition, 
EU membership has as provided a forum for Germany and the UK to coordinate policy 
instruments, for instance in the context of the G6 group of member-states.  
Nonetheless, divergent goals and instruments remain in a number of areas and 
their persistence can largely be explained historically. This is certainly the case for 
approaches to integration and family reunification, and arguably labour migration too. 
Even if overall German unemployment levels were much lower, it is a moot point 
whether new non-EU labour migration would be tolerated politically and electorally. 
 29 
Path dependence thus remains an important factor in understanding particularly policy 
goals in this field. 
Neither this convergence nor the instrumental nature of their relationship with the 
EU is limited to the UK and Germany. Other EU immigration countries, principally 
France, the Netherlands, Austria and Sweden share many of the same pressures; they 
also share at least some of the policy goals and at least some of the policy instruments in 
at least some of the areas considered here. Indeed, membership of the EU itself 
represents one of the central pressures towards convergence in a global context.88 But 
equally, it is fair to conclude that, within EU member-states, the UK and Germany show 
a high degree of convergence across a range of fields.  
How much of this is due to the purported ideological closeness of the Labour and 
SPD-Green governments? Apart from the general and abstract desire to shape labour 
migration in the respective country’s interests, as well as the example of the adoption of 
the 2000 Race Equality Directive, a common ideological purpose, as put forward in the 
Third Way document, is difficult to distinguish. Instead, where convergence has taken 
place, it has generally been in response either to the various pressures outlined here, 
refracted through the prism of national political priorities.  
To conclude, the extent of policy convergence established here is likely to 
increase in coming years. Not only will the pressures identified above persist in at least 
the medium term, but the EU is expanding into new areas of activity, as laid down in the 
2004 Hague Programme.89 One of these is the management of economic migration, on 
which the Commission already published a Green Paper in 2005.90 Therefore, in 
immigration and integration policy, not only in the UK and Germany but across the EU, 
convergence appears to be very much the order of the day. 
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Table 1: Immigration and Citizenship in the UK and Germany, 2002-2005 
(thousands) 
 UK Germany 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Net foreign 
immigration 
245 236 342 292 153 103 55 96 
New asylum 
applications 
103 60 40 30 71 51 36 29 
Total non-
national 
population 
2,587a 2,760 n/a n/a 7,336 7,335 6,717b 6,756b 
Naturalisations 120 126 141 162 155 141 127 117 
a
 2001 
b
 From 2004, the total is calculated on a different basis to previous years and is therefore not comparable. 
Sources: UNHCR, Home Office, Office of National Statistics, Statistisches Bundesamt, Eurostat 
 
Figure 1: Asylum applications in EU-15, 1980-2005 
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Table 2: Policy convergence in immigration and integration policy 
 Labour and dependant 
migration 
Citizenship and 
integration 
Asylum policy 
Convergence in 
goals 
Yes Yes Yes 
Convergence in 
instruments 
No Partial Partial 
Key aspects of 
divergence 
Unskilled labour 
migration; dependant 
migration 
Philosophies of 
integration; dual 
citizenship 
Limited to individual 
elements 
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